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The Wagon Mound in Canadian Courts
R. D. GmSON '
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, by its decision
in The Wagon Mound,' has purported to substitute a new standard
of remoteness of damage in tort for the controversial standard laid
down in Be PoeMiS.2 Strictly speaking, the decision affects only
Australian law, but it has attracted a great deal of attention all over
the common law world.3 In England, the case has been approved in
several dicta,4 and in Scotland it has been judicially noticed without
*R. D. Gibson, Assistant Professor, Manitoba Law School, Winnipeg,
Manitoba. This article is a revised version of a paper read at the annual
meeting of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers, June 7, 1962, at
Osgoode Hall Law School. The section in which the pre-Wagon Mound
Canadian authorities are examined was originally published as part of an
article entitled "Remoteness of Damage in Tort", (1962) 34 Manitoba Bar
News 33, at p. 36 ff., and appears here with the consent of the editor of the
Manitoba Bar News.
1 Overseas Tankslzsp (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd.
[1961] A.C. 388; 2 W.L.R. 126; 1 All E.R. 404.
2 In Re Polems and Furness, Withy & Co. [1921) 3 K.B. 560.
3The literature on the case is already voluminous. I have found the
following selection of articles particularly useful: A. L. Goodhart, Obituary:
Re Polemis, (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 175, and The Wagon Mound Followed by the
Lord Chief Justice, (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 160; Glanville Williams, The Risk Prin-
ciple, (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 179; R. W. M. Dias, Negligence-Remotene3s-The PoZemis
Rule, (1961) C.L.J. 23, and Negligence-Remoteness-The Wagon Mound Rule,
(1962) C.L.C. 20; P. S. James, Polemis: The Serpent in Eden, (1961) J.B.L.
252, and Polemis: The Scotc'd Snake, (1962) J.B.L. 147; Douglas Payne,
Foresight and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence, (1962) 25 M.L.R. 1;
Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, (1961) 61 Col. L.R. 1401, and
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, (1962) 60 Mich, L.R. 543;
G. H. L. Fridman, Negligence and Remoteness, (1961) 111 L.J. 609 and 624;
A. M. Honord, Torts-Negligence-Foreseeable Damage, (1961) 39 Can. Bar
Rev. 267; J. G. Fleming, The Passing of Polemis, (1961) 39 Can. Bar Rev.
489.
4The cases in which they appear are discussed at a later stage of this
article. Professor Goodhart suggested, in Obituary: Be Polemis, supra,
footnote 3, that the Court of Appeal, or even a court of first instance in
England, would be justified in refusing to follow Re Polemis in spite of Its
re-affirmation by the Court of Appeal in Thurogood v. Van Den Berghs cG Jur-
gens Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 537; 1 All E.R. 682, because of the confused state of the
authorities. Lord Parker, C.J., adopted this suggestion in Smith v. Leech
Brain & Co. Ltd., infra, footnote 73, where he said, obiter dictum, "... I
would follow, sitting as a trial judge, the decision in the Wagon Mound
case; or rather, more accurately, I would treat myself, in the light of the
arguments in that case, able to follow other decisions of the Court of Appeal
prior to the Polemis case itself ...However, as I have said, that does not
strictly arise in this case." See infra, p. 429.
The Wagon Mound in Canadian Courts
express disapproval.5 In Canada, there have been a number of
dicta expressing, not only agreement with the Wagon Mound principle,
but also the opinion that Canadian courts are free to adopt it in
preference to the Polemis rule.6 The object of this article is to examine
the validity of these dicta.
Re Polemis was a 1921 decision of the English Court of Appeal.
It concerned liability for the destruction of a ship by a fire which
took place when a wooden plank, negligently dropped into the hold,
somehow produced a spark which ignited accumulated gasoline
vapour. One of the defences raised was that the fire was too remote
a consequence of the negligent act to be the basis of liability, since
it could not reasonably have been foreseen that a falling plank
could cause a spark. The Court of Appeal held that the proper
standard for determining remoteness of damage in negligence is
not "reasonable foresight" but "directness." As Scrutton, L.J.,
put it:
To determine whether an act is negligent, it is relevant to determine
whether any reasonable person would foresee that the act would cause
damage; it he would not, the act is not negligent. But if the act would
or might probably cause damage, the fact that the damage it in fact
causes is not the exact kind of damage one would expect is immaterial,
so long as the damage is in fact directly traceable to the negligent
act... 7
Since it had been found as a fact that some damage to the ship
(a dented hull, perhaps) could reasonably have been foreseen, and
since the Court of Appeal felt that the fire was a direct consequence
of the dropping of the plank, the "remoteness" defence was rejected,
and the defendant was held liable for the destruction of the ship.
The Wagon Mound was a 1961 decision of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Supreme Court of New
South Wales. The action arose from an unusual accident which took
place in Sidney harbour in 1951. While the "Wagon Mound" was
taking on fuel oil at a wharf in the harbour, its crew negligently
allowed a large quantity of oil to spill into the water. This oil
spread to the vicinity of the plaintiff's wharf about 200 yards away,
where it caused some slight damage by fouling the plaintiff's slip-
ways. Two and a half days later, sparks from welding operations
on the plaintiff's wharf ignited a piece of waste which was floating
5 Oman v. McIntyre [1962J S.L.T. 168, and the cases referred to therein.
See infra, p. 43L
6 See, for example, the remarks of Miller, C.J.M., in Munroe Equipment
Sales Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., (1961) 29 D.L.R. (2nd) 730,
at p. 739, and Ferguson, J., in A. R. Williams Machinery Co. Ltd., v. Muttart
Builders Supply (Winnipeg) Limited (1961) 35 W.W.R. 132, at p. 137. The
writer commented at more length on the latter case in Remoteness of Damage
in Tort, (1962) 34 Man. B.N. 33. Davey, J.A., displayed some doubt about
the possibility of applying The Wagon Mound without the sanction of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Munshaw Colour Service Limited v. Vancouver
City (1961) 35 W.W.R. 696, at p. 702 [affirmed without reference to this
problem in (1961) 33 W.W.R. 335].
7 [1921) 3 K.B. 577.
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on the oil beneath the wharf. This burning waste acted as a "wick"
to ignite the oil which, according to expert evidence, could not have
been ignited directly by the falling sparks. The resulting fire
caused considerable damage to the plaintiff's wharf and to a nearby
ship. The Supreme Court of New South Wales, finding that the
fouling of the slipways could reasonably have been foreseen, but that
the fire could not, held for the plaintiff. The court stated that the
defence of remoteness was ruled out by Re Polemis, although it made
it quite clear that it was not happy with the decision which it felt
precedent forced it to make. Manning, J. said:
I can only express the hope that, if not in this case, then in some other
case in the near future, the subject will be pronounced upon by the
House of Lords or the Privy Council...s
The Privy Council, speaking through Viscount Simonds, responded
to what it called "this cri de coeur" 9 by overruling Re Polemis
and allowing the defendant's appeal. The true test for remoteness
of damage in negligence, said the Privy Council, is the same as
that which Hadley v. Baxendale'o established long ago as the test
for contract: reasonable foreseeability of the particular injury suf-
fered. Since the fire was an unforeseeable, and therefore remote,
consequence of the spilling of the oil, the defendant could not, in
the Privy Council's opinion, be held liable for it.
It is the writer's thesis that Canadian courts should remain
loyal to the principle of Re PoZemis, and refuse to follow The Wagon
Mound. It is submitted that this conclusion is dictated both by
precedent and by considerations of policy.
PRECEDENT
The authorities on which the Court of Appeal relied in Re
Polemis were, as Viscount Simonds pointed out in The Wagon Mound,
far from conclusive.
The strongest was probably Smith, v. The London & South Western
Railway Co." This was the case in which the plaintiff's cottage,
which was a considerable distance from the defendant's railway
line, was burned when sparks from a locomotive fell on heaps of
dry grass along the railway, causing a fire which spread to a hedge,
then to a stubble field, and eventually across a road to the cottage.
Most of the seven Exchequer Chamber judges who heard the case
seemed to feel that although some damage by fire was foreseeable,
the burning of the plaintiff's cottage was not. Nevertheless, they
were unanimous in holding the railway company liable for the
destruction of the cottage. Three judges specifically stated that
once an act is negligent there is liability for all consequent loss,
whether foreseeable or not. Kelly, C.B., stated:
s Quoted in [1961] A.C. at pp. 414-5.
9 Ibid.
10 (1854) 9 Exch. 341.
1 (1870) L.R 6 C.P. 14.
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It may be that they did not anticipate, and were not bound to anticipate,
that the plaintiff's cottage would be burnt as a result of their negligence;
but I think the law is, that if they were aware that these heaps were
lying by the side of the rails, and that it was a hot season, and that
therefore by being left there the heaps were likely to catch fire, the
defendants were bound to provide against all circumstances which
might result from this, and were responsible for all the natural con-
sequences of it.12
Similar statements were made by Channel, B.,13 and Blackburn, J.14
The other judges did not specifically refer to the problem, but Martin,
B., with whom Bramwell, B., concurred, said he was "of the same
opinion" as Kelly, C.B. Piggott, B., said he was "of the same opinion"
as Blackburn, J., although he seems to have felt that the destruction
of the cottage was reasonably foreseeable. Lush, J., expressed no
opinion on the matter.
Viscount Simonds, in The Wagon Mound,15 pointed out four facts
which he felt undermined the strength of the Smith case. First,
not one of the judges cited authority to support the principle they
enunciated. Second, the problem facing the court involved a greater
extent of damage than was foreseeable; not, as in Re Polemis, a
totally different kind of damage than could have been anticipated.1 6
Third, he said that not one judge saw fit to mention any limitation
(such as the "directness" requirement referred to in Re Polemis)
to the "sweeping proposition" that a negligent person is liable for
all the consequences of his wrongful act. This is not entirely correct.
In the passage quoted above, Kelly, C.B. referred to "natural con-
sequences." The term "natural" is often used as a synonym for
"direct" in this context, as Viscount Simonds himself acknowledged
by using the phrase ". . 'direct' or 'natural' consequence. . ." at a
later point' 7 in his opinion. Viscount Simonds' fourth point, one
which is related to the first, was that, ". . . the law of negligence
as an independent tort was then of recent growth and ... its impli-
cations had not been fully examined."' 8 A fifth point, which Viscount
Simonds did not mention, is that the report of the case does not
indicate who owned the stubble field. If it were not owned by the
plaintiff, he would have been an "unforeseeable plaintiff", and the
case would not be compatible with Bourhill v. Young.' 9
Neither of the other principal cases cited in Re Polemis can be
regarded as overwhelming authority, either. In H.M.S. London2°
the President of the Probate Division, purporting to apply the state-
12Ibid., p 20.
13 Ibid., p. 21.
14Ibid.
15 [19611 A.C. 416.16 S IS it not possible, however, for a difference as great as that between
the burning of a stubble field (which could conceivably be to the advantage
of the landowner) and the burning of a house to be regarded as one of
substance or kind? See infra, p. 436.
'7 [1961] A.C. 426.
l8 Ibid., p. 416.
19 [1943] A. C. 92. Professor Green criticized this argument in "Fore-
seeability in Negligence Law, supra, footnote 3. His criticism is based on
his own variation of the "risk theory." See infra, footnote 93.
20 [1914] P. 72.
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ments I have referred to from the Smith case, held that the owners of
a ship which negligently collided with another at sea were responsible
not only for the cost of repairing the other ship and the loss of
profits for the time during which the ship could reasonably be ex-
pected to be out of service for repairs, but also for the loss of profits
occasioned by the repairs being delayed by a strike of workmen.
However, the "directness" requirement, and the decision in Owners of
Liesbosc Dredger v. Owners of Edison21 might cause even some
supporters of Re Polemis to wonder whether this case was correctly
decided. And a further shadow of doubt is cast on the case by the
strange statement that:
It is settled law that the rule as to remoteness of damage Is the same
whether the damages are claimed in actions of contract or of tort... 22
In Weld-Blundell v. Stephens23 the House of Lords held, in a three to
two majority decision, that a person who, in breach of a contractual
duty of secrecy owed to the plaintiff, carelessly disclosed to a third
party a letter in which the plaintiff defamed the third party, with
the result that the third party successfully sued the plaintiff for libel,
was not liable to the plaintiff, since the libel action was not the direct
result of the disclosure. Lord Sumner, who agreed with the majority,
made the following statement, for which he cited the Smitk case as
authority:
What a defendant ought to have anticipated as a reasonable man
is material when the question is whether or not he was guilty of negli-
gence, that is, of want of due care according to the circumstances. This,
however, goes to culpability, not to compensation.24
This comment was, however, purely obiter dictum, since the case in-
volved contractual, rather than tortious obligations. And to the ex-
tent that the dictum asserts that a defendant is not liable for the
indirect, though foreseeable consequences of his wrongful act, it is
wrong.2
21 [1933] A.C. 449.
22 [1914] P. 77. HadZey v. Baxendale, supra, footnote 10, was apparently
overlooked.
23 [1920] A.C. 956.
24Ibid., p. 984.
25 It is really inaccurate to speak of the "directness" test of remoteness,
since directness has never been the sole criterion. The foreseeable conse-
quences of the defendant's wrongful conduct have always been actionable,
even if indirect. Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B. 146, is a good illustration
of this. Greer, L.J., said at p. 156 of that case:
"If what is relied upon as novus actus interveniens is the very kind
of thing which is likely to happen if the want of care which Is alleged
takes place, the principle embodied in the maxim is no defence... .
Directness has, therefore, always been relevant only with respect to un-
foreseeable consequences. It is true that Be Polemis contains language which
could be interpreted as meaning that directness is the sole test, and Viscount
Simonds indicated that he so interpreted the case when he said:
".. . it would be wrong that he should escape liability, however 'indirect'
the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably foresee the intervening
events which led to its being done. ... " ([1961] A.C. 426).
If this is what the Court of Appeal intended in Re Polemis, however, It Is
clearly obiter dictum, and inconsistent with cases like Haynes v. Harwood,
in which the point has actually arisen and been settled.
(VOL. 2:416
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It must be admitted, then, that the authorities relied upon by
the Court of Appeal in Re Polemis were weak. But were those which
Viscount Simonds cited in The Wagon Mound much stronger? I sub-
mit that they were not.
In support of his attack on Re Polemis, Viscount Simonds refer-
red to cases decided both before and after that decision. Of those
which preceded Re Polemis, the key cases seem to be the twin
decisions of Rigby v. Hewitt 26 and Greenland v. Chaplin,2 7 delivered
on the same day by Pollock, C.B. Both cases contain dicta expressing
cautious approval of the "reasonable foresight" test of remoteness:
I am . . . disposed not quite to acquiesce to the full extent in the
proposition, that a person is responsible for all the possible consequences
of his negligence. I wish to guard against laying down the proposition
so universally; but of this I am quite clear, that every person who
does a wrong, is at least responsible for all the mischievous consequences
that may reasonably be expected to result, under ordinary circumstances
from such misconduct ... 28
... I entertain considerable doubt, whether a person who is guilty of
negligence is responsible for all the consequences which may under any
circumstances arise, and in respect of mischief which could by no pos-
sibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would
have anticipated. Whenever that case shall arise, I shall certainlydesire to hear it argued, and to consider whether the rule of law be
not this: that a person is expected to anticipate and guard against all
reasonable consequences, but that he is not, by the law of England,
expected to anticipate and guard against that which no reasonable man
would expect to occur.29
Viscount Simonds admitted that these statements were pure obiter
dicta, since the problem of remoteness of damage did not arise in
either case, and that Pollock, C.B. was merely expressing his own
views, not those of the majority of the court.30 In addition, two of the
same objections could be made to the cases that he made with
respect to Smith v. The London c South Western Railway Co.: age
(these cases were decided twenty years before the Smith case) and
lack of supporting authorities. Much more important in my opinion,
however, is the fact that the language used by Pollock C.B. makes
it very clear that he was not himself convinced that reasonable fore-
sight is necessarily the proper test for remoteness. All that he seemed
sure of was that some consequences would be too remote, and with
this no one would disagree. It is true that he then expressed tenta-
tive approval of the "reasonable foresight" test, but his hesitation in
doing so is obvious from his language. No other test for remoteness
26 (1850) 5 Exch. 240.2 7 1bid., p. 243.
28 R igby v. Hewitt, at p. 243.
2 9 Greenland v. Ohaplin, at p. 248. There is some doubt about whether
these passages accurately report what Pollock, C.B. said. The Law Journal
report of the case omits the words, "of his negligence" from the first passage(19 L.J. (Ex.) 292) and "who is guilty of negligence" from the second
passage (Ibid., p. 295).
30He did not mention that the majority of the court was, in fact,
opposed to these views. See the comment to that effect in (1850) 5 Exch.
243.
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had been suggested to him. His chief concern was, it seems to me,
simply to point out that there are some consequences of wrongful
conduct for which the defendant cannot be made liable.
Of the five other pre-Poemis cases relied on by Viscount Simonds,
three were, I believe, based on these dicta of Pollock C.B. In two of
the cases, Cory & Son, Ltd. v. France, Fenwick & Co., Ltd.31 and
Mlark v. Ghambers32 the court expressed approval of the Chief Baron's
words, but since in both cases the consequence complained of by the
plaintiff was found to be foreseeable, the question of liability for un-
foreseeable consequences was not relevant, and the statements of
approval were, like the remarks they approved, pure obiter dicta.
In the third case, Sharp v. Powell,33 the court did not expressly refer
to the Pollock decisions (or to any other cases, for that matter) but
it is likely that they influenced the court, since they were cited in
argument. This case (to which only passing reference was made in
Re Polemis) seems to me to be the strongest authority offered by
those who support the "reasonable foresight" test of remoteness. It
involved the question of whether a man who washed his van in a
public street contrary to statute was liable for injuries to the plaintiff's
horse, incurred when it slipped on ice formed by the spilled water,
which would have run safely away down a sewer had it not been
unforeseeably plugged with ice. The three judges of the Court of
Common Pleas who tried the action 34 were unanimous in dismissing
it on the ground that:
The damage in question, not being one which the defendant could
fairly be expected to anticipate as likely to ensue from his act, is
too remote.35
This cannot, like most of the judicial pronouncements cited by
Viscount Simonds, be disposed of by the label "obiter dictum"; it is
undeniably the ratio decidendi of all three opinions. But its meaning
is not entirely clear. There are some, for example, who have suggested
that the court felt the breach of this particular statute could give rise
to civil liability only if the defendant were negligent in having dis-
obeyed it, and that the court was simply holding that since no harm
could reasonably have been foreseen, there was no duty owed to the
plaintiff, and could therefore be no negligence.36 I don't think this
is a correct interpretation. The judges referred repeatedly to the
defendant's "wrongful" conduct, indicating, I think, that they were
satisfied on the question of "culpability", and were directing their
minds to "compensation." However, since the finding of culpability
was not based on negligence, but on either a breach of statutory duty
31 [1911] 1 K.B. 114.
32 (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 327.
33 (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 253.
34 Bovill, C.J., Grove, J., and Keating, J.35 Per Keating, J., at p. 261.36 See, for example, the Payne article (supra, footnote 3, at p. 11), the
Weir article (Ibid, at p. 623), and the comments of Lord Sumner In Weld-
Blundell v. Stephens [1920] A.C. 984.
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or public nuisance, the case is not strictly binding authority with
respect to remoteness of damage in negligence actions.
The two cases which cannot be traced back to the Pollock dicta
shed very little additional light. In Lynch v. Knight,3 7 Lord Wensley-
dale commented favourably on the "reasonable foresight" test in
connection with a woman's claim for loss of her husband's consortium
due to slanderous remarks about her made to the husband by the
defendant. Lord Wensleydale's comment was obiter dictum for two
reasons: the action failed primarily because it was held that the action
for loss of consortium is not available to a wife, and in any event, the
court found that the husband's leaving the wife as a result of the
slander was foreseeable. In Hadley v. Baxendale3 "reasonable fore-
sight" was established as the standard for remoteness of damage in
contract. Viscount Simonds argued, rather ingeniously, that the case
was also an implied authority on remoteness of damage in tort. The
plaintiff had made an alternative claim based on tort, and Viscount
Simonds asserted that the court's failure to discuss the tort claim
after dismissing the contract claim for remoteness indicates that the
contract and tort tests are the same. I submit, however, that a more
likely explanation of the court's silence with respect to the tort ques-
tion, and one which is borne out both by the facts of the case and by
the language in which the judgment was couched, is that the court
felt that there was no justification for a claim in tort; the problem
was strictly one of contract.
Of the post-PoZemis cases cited by Viscount Simonds the most
important are three well-known House of Lords decisions: Glasgow
Corporation v. Muir,39 Bourkill v. Young,4 0 and Woods v. Duncan.41
Not one of these cases involved the problem of remoteness of damage.
Each was decided either on the question of whether there was fore-
seeability of any harm to the plaintiff, so as to establish a duty of
care, or on the question of whether the defendant had acted reason-
ably in the circumstances. It is true that Lord Russell of Killowen
stated in Bourhill v. Young that reasonable foreseeability is relevant
to compensation as well as to culpability,42 but this was clearly obiter
dictum, since the decision was based on lack of a duty of care. It is
also true that the rule in Bourhill v. Young is logically incompatible
with that in Re Polemis, but the cases are clearly reconcilable in
law,43 which seldom allows itself to be intimidated by logic.44
37 (1861) 9 H.L.C. 577.38 Supra, footnote 10.
39 [1943] A.C. 448.
40 [1943] A.C. 92.
41 [1946] A.C. 401.
42 [1943] A.C. 101.43 Thurogood v. Van Den Berghs & Jurgens Ltd., supra, footnote 4.
44 1 must frankly confess that, for the same reasons I support Re Polemis;I believe that the Bourhill decision was wrong, and that its effect should belimited by every device possible, however illogical. Such judicial deviceshave, of course, a long and honourable history. See, for example, Best v.
Fox [1952] A.C. 716.
1963]
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I think it can fairly be concluded that the English precedents on
remoteness of damage in negligence were in a chaotic state prior to
the Wagon Mound decision. Neither "directness" nor "reasonable fore-
sight" could claim impeccable credentials. The Canadian authorities,
however, though perhaps not decisive, are much less confused. The
"directness" test has been applied in this country by trial courts, by
provincial courts of appeal, and by the Supreme Court of Canada,
while the "reasonable foresight" test has scarcely ever been referred
to. I intend to deal only with the Supreme Court decisions on the
point.45
The Supreme Court seems to have accepted the "directness"
doctrine as long ago as 1895, when, in The Toronto Railway Company
v. Grinstead,46 King, J. said for the majority of the court:
When one, whether in performance of a contract or not, takes charge
of the person or property of another, there arises a duty of reasonable
care.... And if by his own act he creates circumstances of danger and
subjects the person or property to risk without exercising reasonable
care to guard against injury or damage, he is responsible for such injury
and damage to the person or property as arises as the direct or natural
and probable consequence of the wrongful act
and awarded damages to a man who had become ill as a result of
exposure to very cold weather after being wrongfully ejected from a
street-car by an employee of the defendant. King, J. seems to have
held that the illness was the "direct" result of the wrongful act, but
not the "natural and probable" result.4 7 However, the fact that he
later reverted to the concept of "natural and probable" result,48 to-
gether with the fact that the case involved contractual obligations,
casts some doubt on the strength of its authority.
Probably the strongest Canadian authority in support of the
"directness" test is Bartlett v. Winnipeg Electric Railway Company
and Canadian Northern Railway Company,49 decided two years before
Re Polemis. The action arose from a tragic accident which occurred
at a level railway crossing in the city of Winnipeg. A street car,
proceeding along Portage Avenue, came to a halt a few feet before
crossing the C.N.R. tracks. Street railway regulations required the
motor-men of all street cars to stop at railway crossings, and not to
proceed until the conductor gave the signal to go ahead. The con-
ductor of this street car walked ahead to see whether the track was
clear. It was not; a C.N.R. freight train was approaching slowly,
about 75 feet from the crossing. At this point, the motor-man, who
also saw the train, decided not to walt for the conductor's signal,
but to cross the tracks in front of the train. As the street car began
45 For the treatment of the problem by trial courts and courts of appeal,
see the exhaustive survey of cases in Duce v. Rourke (1951) 1 W.W.R. (N.S.)
305. See also Honan v. McLean (1953) 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 523, and TerminaZ
Warehouses Ltd. v. J. H. Lock &. Sons Ltd. (1958) 12 D.L.R. (2d) 12.
46 (1895) 24 S.C.R. 570, at pp. 5734.
47 Ibid., p. 574.
48 Ibid., p. 575.
49 (1919) 59 S.C.R. 352.
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to move, the plaintiff's wife, who was a passenger, ran to the
rear platform of the car, apparently fearing a collision. When
the train was about 50 feet from the crossing, a brakeman riding on
the front of it shouted to the motor-man to hurry up and get over
the tracks. At this, the motor-man applied extra power, and the
street car jerked ahead, crossing safely in front of the train. The
plaintiff's wife, however, was either thrown from the rear platform
by the jerking motion of the car, or jumped in panic, and fell onto
the tracks, where she was run over and killed by the oncoming train.
The action was settled, so far as the plaintiff's claim was concerned,
but it proceeded to trial and appeal on the issue of whether the C.N.R.
was jointly liable with the street railway company, or whether, as the
Manitoba Court of Appeal held,50 the latter company was solely
responsible. The Supreme Court of Canada held, by a majority of
three judges to two, that the C.N.R. was jointly liable. Duff, J., one
of the majority, found that the acts of the C.N.R. employees were
negligent, and then raised the problem of whether the death of the
plaintiff's wife was nevertheless too remote a consequence of that
act. He dealt with the problem as follows:
Are the damages too remote? Was the running down of Mrs. Bartlett
in the circumstances a consequence for which in law the respondent
company was responsible? The rule as regards remoteness of damage
was recently discussed by the President of the Probate and Divorce
Division in H.M.S. London (1914) P. 72, and, with respect, I concur in
the view there expressed that where the harm in question is the direct
and immediate consequence of the negligent act then it is within the
ambit of liability. Here the injury complained of was the direct and
immediate consequence of the failure to stop the train.
Moreover, it is sufficient in this case to say that the railway company
being under an obligation to take precautions to obviate the risk of
harming the passengers in the electric car through the instrumentality
of its train moving across the car track and the wrongful neglect of
this duty having resulted directly in the very harm it was the duty of
the company to avoid, remoteness of damage is out of the question ...
Where there is a duty to take precautions to obviate a given risk the
wrongdoer who fails in this duty cannot avoid responsibility for the
very consequences it was his duty to provide against by suggesting
that the damages are too remote, because the particular manner in
which those consequences came to pass was unusual and not reasonably
foreseeable.51
Anglin, J., made clear his rejection of the "reasonable foresight"
test of remoteness by quoting with approval the following passage
from Smith v. The London & South Western Railway Company:
* . . where there is no direct evidence of negligence, the question
what a reasonable man might foresee is of importance in considering
the question whether there is evidence for the jury of negligence or
not . . .; but when it has once been determined that there is evidence
of negligence, the person guilty of it is equally liable for its consequences,
whether he could have foreseen them or not.5 2
50 (1918) 43 D.L.R. 326.
51 (1919) 59 S.C.R., at p. 367.
52 (1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 14, at p. 21, quoted in the Bartlett case at p. 369.
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The third majority judge, lignault, J., did not deal with the problem
of remoteness; he restricted his discussion to the problem of whether
the acts of the C.N.R. employees were negligent. Both dissenting
judges, Idington, J., and Brodeur, J., based their opinions purely on
what they felt to be the lack of negligence attributable to the C.N.R.;
neither dealt with remoteness of damage. At one time the writer held
the opinion that this case compelled Canadian courts to apply the
"directness" test.53 . I now believe, however, that it can be reconciled
with the "reasonable foresight" test by adopting a restricted in-
terpretation of "foresight."' . Nevertheless, the case constitutes an
acceptance by the Supreme Court (or at least by a "majority"
thereof) of the principal authorities on which the decision in Re
PoZemis was based two years later.
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court display a similar
tendency to favour the "directness" approach. In Regent Taxi &f
Transport Co. v. La Congregation des Petits Freres de Marie,55 Anglin,
C.J.C., expressed approval of the Polemis decision, although the case
was reversed on other grounds by the Privy Council,56 and in any
event it concerned Quebec civil law. In The King v. Canadian Pacific
Railway Company57 Rand, J., applied a statement from an earlier
case Lumley v. Gye57a that the law will redress only "... the
proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts . . .", but
other members of the court reached the same conclusion for
different reasons. In Booth et al. v. St. Catharines58 Estey, J.,
purported to apply the Polemis test, but it probably was not applicable,
since the facts were such that it seems likely that the defendant's
employees could reasonably have been expected to foresee the actual
injuries which occurred. In Harding v. Edwards and Tatisich59 the
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously affirmed a decision of the
Appellate Division of the Ontario Supreme Court6o in which Re
53 (1962) 34 Man. B.N., at p. 37 ff.
54 See infra, p. 429 ff.
55 [1929] S.C.R. 650, at pp. 660-1. The plaintiff was a religious organiza-
tion which claimed to have suffered loss as a result of one of its members
being negligently injured by the defendant.
56 [1932) A.C. 295.
57 [1947) S.C.R. 185, at p. 196. The defendant's employees left a gate
open, so that it projected over the plaintiff's railway tracks, and caused
injury to an employee of the plaintiff who was riding on the front of a
train. An action for recovery of compensation which the plaintiff was
required by statute to pay to its injured employee failed on the ground of
remoteness.57a (1853), 22 L.J. (Q.B.) 463 at 479.
58 [1948] S.C.R. 564, at pp. 5834. At a "V.-J. Day" celebration in a public
park a flag tower collapsed from the weight of several boys who had climbed
onto it, and injured several persons who were standing beneath it. The city,
whose employees had made some boys get off the tower earlier in the day,
was held liable for not exercising greater care in keeping them away.
59 [1931] S.C.R. 167. When the defendant's automobile turned out of a
heavy stream of traffic in a passing manoeuvre, an oncoming car was forced
to turn onto the shoulder of the road, where it went out of control, crossed
the road, and collided with the car of the plaintiff, who had been driving
behind the defendant. The plaintiff's action succeeded.
60 [19292 4 D.L.R. 598.
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Polemis was applied, but unfortunately the Supreme Court of Canada
did not give written reasons for its decision.
Although each of these cases contains some feature which pre-
vents it from being regarded as a conclusive authority in itself, I
submit that their total effect, coupled with the lack of any Supreme
Court approval of the "reasonable foresight" test of remoteness,
amounts to extremely weighty authority in favour of the "directness"
test.
POLICY
It may be asked why, with the English authorities in so incon-
clusive a state, the Privy Council felt compelled to overrule the long
standing decision of Re Polemis. A clue to the answer can, I believe,
be found in the language used by Viscount Simonds. Phrases like
"palpable injustices",61 "current ideas of justice and morality, 62 and
"the common conscience of mankind"63 occur with sufficient frequency
throughout his opinion to indicate that the Privy Council was really
much more concerned with the adequacy or justice of the Polemis
rule than with its legal pedigree. I am not suggesting that the Privy
Council was wrong in paying heed to policy considerations. My
criticism is that it erred in deciding that the "directness" test is less
just than the "reasonable foresight" test.
Three principal complaints about the justice of the Polemis rule
can be extracted from the Wagon Mound judgment: that the vague-
ness of the "directness" concept makes it impossible to apply in prac-
tice, that there is no good reason for the tort and contract remoteness
tests to be different, and that the Polemis rule is unduly harsh to
defendants. I propose to examine each of these objections in turn.
DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING POLEMIS RULE
Viscount Simonds' belief that the "directness" test is unworkable
was very forcibly stated. He referred to:
,* . consequences which are not 'direct', whatever that may mean.. •64
•. the never-ending and insoluble problems of causation,65
. scholastic theories of causation and their ugly and barely intelligiblejargon,66
and so on. In his opinion, if the "reasonable foresight" test were
substituted;
" ..... it is hoped that the law will be thereby simplified."6 7
I disagree both that "directness" is unworkable, and that "reasonable
foresight" would be easier to apply.
61 [1961] A.C. 422.
62 Ibid., p. 422.
63lbd., p. 423.
64 Ibid., p. 416.
65 Ibid., p. 423.
66 Ibid., p. 419.
67Ib, p. 422.
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I do not pretend that the task of assigning a "direct" or "proxi-
mate" cause to a particular event is an easy one, but it is a type of task
which the courts have shown themselves capable of performing in the
past. And, generally speaking, the standard laid down by Re PolZemis
has been applied intelligently by the courts. It cannot be denied,
however, that there have been many questionable interpretations of
the concept over the years. A striking illustration of this is provided
by the Wagon Mound decision itself. To me,68 it is a strained inter-
pretation of the term to hold, as both the Australian courts and the
Privy Council did, that the spilling of the oil was the direct cause of a
fire which occurred more than two days later, when a piece of waste
happened to float into a position to catch a spark falling from welding
operations that happened to be carried on above by free-willed human
beings. I believe that these inconsistent interpretations can be at-
tributed to three factors, two of which are capable of remedy, and one
of which is inherent in the nature of the judicial process.
In the first place, many courts have attempted to formulate a
logical test for "directness", and have become hopelessly enmeshed in
tne sophistry of causation. Their basic error has been to assume that
"directness" is a logical concept. It is an arbitrary standard, and
arbitrary standards must be applied arbitrarily. What is called for
is not a finding of fact, but a value judgment. The task is not to trace
a causal connection between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's
injury (this is a relatively simple preliminary factual matter); it is
to decide whether the defendant's act, if a cause in fact, should, in
view of all of the circumstances, be regarded as closely (proximately,
directly) enough related to the injury to be the basis of liability.
The problem is not to determine the cause; it is to select which
causes ought to be treated as relevant to liability. The guide must be,
not logic, but common sense.
Secondly, a great deal of the confusion can be blamed on the
bewildering vocabulary that has grown up in this area. Terms like
"proximate cause", "causa causans", "unbroken chain of causation",
"last clear chance", "immediate cause," "lack of a novus actus inter-
veniens", and the other phrases which Viscount Simonds described
as "ugly and barely intelligible jargon," are all intended to express a
single idea: direct cause. But the profusion of labels has led to the
belief that there are a number of distinct concepts involved. An
authoritative pronouncement acknowledging the unity of these various
terms and expressing a preference for one of them would do much to
clear away the smoke, and make it easier for the courts to get down
to the job of applying the concept which the terms describe.
6SAnd to others. See, for example, the Honor6 article (supra, footnote
3, at p. 274 and 275) where it is pointed out that the defendant could have
been relieved of liability, under the Polemis rule by a finding (which in
Professor Honor&'s opinion would have been completely justified) that the
spilling of the oil was not the direct cause of the fire.
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Finally, some discrepancies will always exist between the inter-
pretations given by different judges to similar language. What is
"direct" to one judge may not always be regarded as "direct" by
other judges. This, however, is a difficulty that exists with respect
to all general language, including the concept of "reasonableness," yet
has seldom prevented the courts from doing substantial justice. On
the contrary, it is the latitude afforded by such relatively vague
standards which largely accounts for the high proportion of "just"
decisions in these cases.
I submit, then, that "directness" is not an inherently unwork-
able standard. Freed of some of the confusion which presently sur-
rounds the idea, I believe that the courts are capable of applying it as
meaningfully as they have applied the concept of "reasonableness."
It is Viscount Simonds' assertion that adoption of the "reason-
able foresight" test for remoteness would simplify the law, to which
I take the greatest exception. As soon as a court attempts to apply
the Wagon Mound rule, it finds itself faced with the question, "What
is it that must reasonably have been foreseen?" The Privy Council
has not provided an adequate answer. It did state that the "con-
sequences"6 9 of the defendant's act must have been reasonably fore-
seeable, and that:
... the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage
is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen. 70
But words like "kind" and "consequences" are open to various inter-
pretations. In fact, three distinct meanings are possible: the extent
of the plaintiff's injury, the nature of the interest interfered with,
and the manner in which the injury occurred. Yet not one of these
interpretations is wholly satisfactory.
Viscount Simonds distinguished Smith v. London & South Western
Railway71 on the ground that it dealt with a mere difference between
the extent of the injury suffered and that foreseeable.72 Clearly,
then, he did not intend "kind" to mean "extent". This view was
confirmed by the first English case to give extensive consideration
to the Wagon Mound doctrine, Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd.73 A
metal worker was, as a result of the defendant's negligence, burned
on the upper lip by a piece of molten metal or flux. Ultimately,
cancer developed in the area of the burn, and finally resulted in the
man's death more than 3 years after the burn was sustained. It was
found that:
S.. the burn was the promoting agency, promoting cancer in tissues
which already had a pre-malignant condition as a result of his having
worked at gas works, where he would have been in contact with tar or
tar vapours from 1926 to 1935.74
69 [1961] A.C. 422-3.
70Tbid., p. 426. Emphasis added.
71 Supra, footnote 11.
72Ibid, p. 416.
73 [1962] 2 W.L.R. 148; [1961] 3 All E.R. 1159.
74 [1961] 3 All E.R. 1160.
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Lord Parker, C.J., of the Queen's Bench Division, held the defendant
liable for the man's death. In doing so, he distinguished The Wagon
Mound on the ground that it did not concern the problem of the
injury sustained being greater in extent than that which was fore-
seeable. He held that the case before him was governed instead by
the "thin skull" cases,75 for which the rule is that the defendant
must take the plaintiff as he finds him:
If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently Injured in
his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for damages that he
would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had
an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart.76
I have no quarrel with the outcome of this case, but I don't believe
that it is reconcilable with The Wagon Mound. Surely death by
cancer is not the same type of injury as a burn on the lip. The
difference is more than one of extent. And even if it were only a
question of extent, I submit that vast differences in extent of damage
(such as the difference between burning a stubble field and burning
a house) should, if the law is to maintain contact with common
sense, be treated in the same way as a difference in kind.
Injuries could be classified according to the nature of the interest
interfered with (damage to land, damage to eyesight, damage to
automobile, loss of life, etc.,). But how broad or narrow are the
categories to be? The fundamental distinction between personal
injury and property injury is clearly too broad. Yet any attempt
to create more limited categories meets with difficulties. Consider,
for example, Warren v. Scruttons Ltd.7 7 As a result of the defendant's
negligence, the plaintiff suffered a minor injury to his finger from a
strand of wire projecting from a wire rope. Several years before,
the plaintiff had suffered from an eye illness, which left him with
blurred vision in one eye, and the danger of developing eye ulcers
and further loss of vision if the body temperature were raised, or
certain viruses were introduced into the system. The injury to his
finger became infected, and this resulted in the development of eye
ulcers and loss of vision. Paull, J., purporting to follow Smith v.
Leech Brain & Co. Ltd., awarded the plaintiff damages for all of
his injuries, including the loss of vision. The case may perhaps be
explained on the ground that the "thin skull" rule is an exception
to the Wagon Mound rule, but it illustrates the problems of trying
to classify injuries in narrower categories than "personal" and
"property.S 0 To what single category do pricked fingers and ulcer-
ated eyes belong? And, of course, if it is the nature of the interest
75 See infra, p. 432.
76 [1961] 3 All E.R. 1161, quoting from Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901]
2 K.B., at p. 679.
77 [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 497.7 8 Supra, footnote 73.79 Infra, p. 432.80 See also Singh v. Corporation of Glasgow [1962] S.L.T. 6, where Lord
Milligan awarded damages with respect to a neurosis developed after inhaling
fumes from an explosion caused by the defendant's negligence.
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affected that is relevant, then Re Polemis was correctly decided, even
by the Wagon Mound rule, since the type of injury which was reason-
able foreseeable and the type suffered were the same: damage to the
plaintiff's ship.
Perhaps, then, it would be better to classify the injuries according
to the manner in which, or agency through which, they occurred
(damage by fire, damage by impact, damage by vibration, etc.). This
seems to be the type of classification that Viscount Simonds had in
mind when he stated that "injury by fire"8 1 was involved in The
Wagon Mound. Here again we encounter the perplexing problem
of where to draw the lines. If liability depended on detailed foresight
of the exact physical processes which resulted in the injury, there
would be few successful personal injury actions. For example, in
Oman v. McIntyre,8 2 an employee of the defendant was working in a
trench, which caved in due to the negligence of the defendant. The
cave-in fractured the employee's right leg. The plaintiff alleged that
the fractures resulted in a fat embolism, which in turn resulted in
pneumonia and the death of the employee four days after the acci-
dent. Lord Milligan, of the Scottish Outer House, held, on a pre-
liminary motion, that the facts alleged by the plaintiff disclosed a
cause of action.8 3 Few supporters of The Wagon Mound would
disagree with this decision, though they could hardly contend that
the exact way in which the death occurred could reasonably have
been foreseen. It has been suggested that such difficulties could be
overcome by distinguishing between the "general" manner of occur-
rence (injury by collapse of the trench), which would have to be
foreseeable, and the "specific" manner of occurrence (death by
pneumonia, caused by fat embolism, resulting from a fracture of
the leg by collapse of the trench), which would not.8 4 But how
81 [1961] A.C. 426.
82 [1962] S.L.T. 168. In Burden v. Watson [1961] S.LT. 67 the same judge
held that a person whose negligence caused an automobile accident was liable
with respect to coronary thrombosis suffered five days later by a person
involved in the accident. See also Oke v. The Queen, Weide Transport Ltd.,
& (arra, infra, footnote 104.
83 The rationale of the decision appears to be that the case is governed
by the "thin skull" rule and Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd., supra, footnote
73. However, Lord Mlilligan also offered an interesting intepretation of
The Wagon Mound:
When considering the Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. it should I think
be noted - and Lord Simonds puts this in the forefront of his advice -
that there was in that case a finding that the defendant did not know
and could not reasonably be expected to have known that the furnace
oil was capable of being set afire when spread on water. The case was,
accordingly, concerned primarily with culpability than with compensa-
tion. Having held that the appellants could not reasonably be expected
to have known that the oil would catch fire, the judicial committee did
not have to consider the extent of the appellant's liability had they been
found negligent. (p. 171).
Lord Milligan seems to have overlooked the finding that some damage
from the oil was foreseeable.
84 See the Fleming article, supra, footnote 3, at p. 524. Professor Fleming
did not recommend the approach, however.
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general is the classification to be? If the damage suffered in The
Wagon Mound were described as "damage by oil", rather than
"damage by burning oil", it would be reasonably foreseeable. Another
suggested approach would be to adopt as the standard for compen-
sation purposes foresight that the damage could possibly have ocurred
in the manner it did (a standard which the courts have rejected for
the purpose of establishing culpability s5):
We all know that it is possible that people may have premalignant
cancer and it is within the reasonable anticipation of the doctors that
a burn may activate it (Smith). It is known that it is possible that a
nail or a piece of flint may lie embedded in a plank and if such a plank
were to fall into a metal hold full of petrol vapour an explosion may
be generated by the causing of a spark (Polemis). But before experi-
ments had been conducted during preparation of the trial It was notknown (according to the evidence) to the scientific world that fuel oil
on water could possibly ignite. So that the ulterior harm In Wagon
Mound could by no possibility have been anticipated when the defendants
let the oil loose from the ship.86
Such an approach could hardly be said to "simplify" the law, however.
Given sufficient time, and litigants on whom to experiment, the
courts will probably solve most of these problems, and develop an
expedient method of classifying injuries by type, but I suggest that
they would be able to solve the problems surrounding the meaning
of "directness" much more easily.
And, of course, the work of the courts will not be finished, even
when the catalogue of injuries is complete. Many other problems
will remain to be solved. For example, is the Wagon Mound rule
to be restricted to negligence cases, or is it to be applied as well to
cases involving intentional wrong-doing or strict liability?87
One of the most perplexing problems, how to reconcile the
Wagon Mound and "thin skull" rules, has already reared its head.
Smith, v. Leeck Brain & Co. Ltd.8 s involved a classic "thin skull"
situation. Lord Parker C.J., applied the "thin skull" rule, after holding
that the Judicial Committee did not have the rule in mind in The
Wagon Mound. There seems little doubt that the decision will be
followed,89 even though a satisfactory method of distinguishing the
Wagon Mound and "thin skull" situations has yet to be advanced.90
85 Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 146 L.T. 391.86 p. S. James, Polemis: The Scotch'd Snake, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 152-3.
87The applicability of the rule to actions based on Rylands v. Fletcher(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, is discussed in R. Jones, Remoteness Rules in Tort,(1962) 4 Sydney L.R. 99, and the Fridman article, supra, footnote 3, at p.
626.88 Supra, footnote 73.89 It has already been followed in Warren v. Scruttons Ltd., supra, foot-
note 77, and (in less obviously applicable circumstances) in Oman v. McIntyre,
supra, footnote 82. See also Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. et al., infra,
footnote 107.
90 Lord Parker, C.3., seemed to base the distinction chiefly on the ques-
tionable finding that death by cancer differs from a burned lip only in
extent. However, Warren v. Scruttons Ltd., clearly involved more than a
difference of extent.
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The better view is probably that the "thin skull" rule will simply be
treated as an exception to the Wagon Mound principle if The Wagon
Mound finds favour with posterity. But how widely will the exception
be allowed to apply? Some writers have suggested that it should
be "limited" to the realm of personal injuries.91 Such a "limitation"
would, of course, severely restrict the operation of the Wagon Mound
rule itself. And one might well ask why "current ideas of justice
and morality" require a different standard for assessing property
damage than for personal injuries.
Even when all of the ramifications of the Privy Council's decision
have been settled, the courts will not have been relieved of the need
to wrestle with the "directness" concept, since it is central to so
many other areas of law, such as trespass, joint tortfeasors and
contributory negligence.
DES IRED UNIFORMITY BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT
Viscount Simonds' second complaint about the Polemis rule
was its incompatibility with the rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxen-
dale for determining remoteness of damage in contract. Surely, how-
ever, there is good reason to distinguish between tort and contract
The essence of the contractual obligation is consent, and, since you
cannot consent to that which you cannot foresee, it is understandable
that "reasonable foresight" should be the standard for remoteness
of damage. But tortious obligations exist quite independently of
consent. Therefore "reasonable foresight" loses the appropriateness
that it has in the contractual context.
POLEMIS UNFAIR TO DEFENDANTS
The third objection to Re Polemis (and probably, in the last
analysis, the most fundamental one) was that it places an unduly
onerous burden on defendants. Viscount Simonds said:
... it does not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality
that for an act of negligence, however slight or venial, which results in
some trivial foreseeable damage the actor should be liable for all
consequences however unforeseeable and however grave, so long as
they can be said to be 'direct'.92
I share the Privy Council's sympathy for the person who acts
carelessly in a situation where the foreseeable risk of some slight
damage is involved, and finds that he has caused some serious
and totally unforeseeable injury. But surely the law would be acting
at least equally as harshly toward the totally innocent plaintiff by
following The Wagon Mound's lead and requiring him to bear the
entire cost of his injuries. Neither case represents a really just
91 See, for example, the Williams article, supra, footnote 3, at p. 197.
92 [19613 A.C. 422.
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solution to the problem.93 As long as the plaintiff's right to com-
pensation for his injuries is necessarily correlative to the defendant's
duty to pay damages, a situation of injustice will exist in this type
of case. Insurance helps, of course, but neither liability insurance
nor disability insurance is in wide enough use to afford adequate
protection. Only the legislatures can provide a really suitable solution.
An act apportioning responsibility for the unforeseeable consequences
of negligent acts between the plaintiff and the defendant would be
of some assistance, although the parties would continue to be
seriously burdened by the consequences of events with respect to
which they were totally or substantially blameless. A far better
solution, in my opinion, would be for the state to step in and com-
pensate the injured plaintiff. Cases of this nature occur so infre-
quently that the cost of such protection would not be unduly great.
In the meantime, however, the courts face the problem of
applying the common law rules so as to create the least possible
injustice. Given the necessity of fixing the entire responsibility for
unforeseeable consequences on one party or the other, it seems to
me that the more just solution is to make the defendant liable, as
the Court of Appeal did in Re Polemis. The plaintiff, after all, is
totally innocent. The defendant is not; he has acted carelessly in a
situation where some resulting harm to the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable. Surely, if one party has to be made solely responsible,
it should be he who was blameworthy, not he who was innocent. 94
93 Professor Leon Green, in the articles referred to in note 3, takes the
position that both the directness and foresight theories are wrong. He
asserts that it is fallacious to describe the problem in "either-or" terms;
that the directness-foresight dichotomy is not an inevitable one. The test
which he prefers to both of these standards is the "risk theory": does the
harm incurred fall within the risk created by the defendant's conduct? As
it is understood by many, the risk theory would produce the same answer
to the remoteness problem as the foresight theory, since the scope of the
risk is thought to be determined by what is reasonably foreseeable. In
Professor Green's view, however, the task of defining the risk Is a matter
of judicial discretion; a decision guided, of course, by factors such as reason-
able foresight and previous decisions, but based fundamentally on policy
considerations. By this theory the decisions in Smith v. The London &
South Western Railway Co., Re Polemis, and The Wagon Mound are all
compatible (or at least capable of having been reached by the same judge,
if he had shared Professor Green's view of the facts). The difficulty with
such an approach (apart from the practical one of persuading the courts
to adopt it) is that it sets up a standard which is not a standard at all; It
simply invites the court to let its decision be governed by the equities of
the situation. It is true that a good judge is influenced by the equities,
whatever standard he chooses to invoke, but Professor Green's approach
overemphasizes the importance of this discretionary factor. Moreover, Courts
of Appeal are more likely to abdicate their supervisory function, (which Is
essential to the effective application of judicial standards) if they feel that
trial decisions are purely discretionary.
94The fact that the "fault' theory has been discredited by the strict
liability cases as a limitation on liability Is no reason to reject it as a
basis for imposing liability.
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CONCLUSION
It is the writer's opinion that neither precedent nor policy
compels the courts to follow the lead of The Wagon Mound. To
date, the British courts appear, by their deeds though not by their
words, to concur in this view. In Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd.95
Warren v. Scruttons Ltd.,98 Oman v. McIntyre,97 Burden v. Watson9 s
and Singh v. Corporation of Glasgow99 liability was imposed with
respect to injuries with unforeseeable aspects. It is true that the
first two decisions contain dicta expressing approval of The Wagon
Mound, and that the other decisions contain no express disapproval
of it. However, from the conduct of the courts it would appear
that if the Wagon Mound principle is to be given any effect at all,
its scope will be severely restricted.
How has the principle been received by Canadian courts? In
addition to the dicta referred to earlier,1 0 0 The Wagon Mound has
been judicially noticed in several Canadian cases.
It was applied by Schroeder, J.A., in a dissenting judgment, in
Foster v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles. 01 And in Lafarge Cement
v. C.N.R.1 02 it was also applied, though in a situation (which also had
contractual aspects) in which the actual damage suffered was reason-
ably foreseeable, and would, therefore, have been resolved the same
way prior to the Wagon Mound decision.1 03
A recent Manitoba decision, Oke v. The Queen et al.104 confirms
that the plaintiff does not have to establish reasonable foresight of
the exact manner in which the injury occurred. A truck, operated
by one of the defendants, knocked down a highway sign, and caused
the steel sign post to be bent, so that it protruded over a portion of
the road, with one end a foot or two from the ground, and the other
still embedded in the ground. The accident was not reported to
highway authorities. The next day a motorist, who was attempting
to pass a truck, collided with the post, which punctured the automobile
and speared the driver, killing him. An action by the driver's widow
succeeded. On the question of remoteness of damage, Tritschler,
C.J.Q.B. stated:
.. the imposition of liability on defendant... will not revive Polemis
nor conflict with the principle stated in the Wagon Mound case....
The reasonably foreseeable, the probable consequence of the absence
of the signs and the presence of the posts was that a vehicle would
9 5 Supra, footnote 73.9 6 Supra, footnote 77.9 7 Supra, footnote 82.98 Ibif.
99 Supra, footnote 80.10 0 Supra, footnote 6.
101 [1961J O.R. 551, at p. 564.
102 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 154.
1o3 Supra, footnote 25.
104 Decided Jan. 12, 1963. Not yet reported.
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collide with the posts. . The foreseeable consequence of such a
collision was injury to the vehicle and its occupants. If the collision
with the post had arrested the forward progress of Oke's car, or causedits upset so that Oke had been injured by his head striking the wind-
shield, or when the automobile overturned, the argument for "unfore-
seeable consequences" would probably not have occurred to the defen-dants . Where injury to persons is foreseeable, the foreseeability
rule does not extend to limit recovery to injuries which are usual or
commonplace.
In Regu s v. Inglis (No. 2),105 the Wagon Mound rule was
actually stated as the reason for finding certain of the plaintiff's
injuries too remote. The plaintiff, who had been negligently injured
by the defendant, was forced by her injuries to sell a nursing home
which she had operated. When she learned that she had been cheated
by the purchaser of the nursing home, the mental depression which
she had experienced as a result of the accident was considerably
deepened. Collins, J., found the defendant liable, but held that the
deepening of the state of depression after the sale could not be taken
into account in assessing damages. In arriving at this decision,
Collins, J. acknowledged that ". . . substantial and respectful con-
sideration has been given . . . to the reasons for judgment in the
Wagon Mound case..."206
However, the situation was clearly one in which the Polemis
rule would have produced the same answer, since there was no
"direct" relationship between the original wrongdoing and the aggra-
vation of the state of depression.
The view that the "thin skull" rule has not been altered by
The Wagon Mound was confirmed by a dictum of Ferguson, J., in
Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. et a7.107 The plaintiff suffered
injuries when an automobile in which she was a passenger was
involved in an accident. One of her injuries occurred because radia-
tion treatment years before had left certain of her neck and shoulder
muscles in a weakened condition. Although he dismissed the action
because of the "gratuitous passenger" section of the Highway Traffic
Act, Ferguson, J., assessed damages, and in doing so included the
aggravated injuries to the neck and shoulder. On this point he
stated:
This last branch of damage Is clearly damage which a reasonable man
could not foresee. Nevertheless it is assessable damage under the rule
laid down in Re Poemis.....
The general trend of the post-Wagon Mound Canadian decisions
appears to be similar to that of the English decisions: to pay lip
service to the principle, without giving substantial effect to it. More-
over, there is still nothing to prevent Canadian courts from taking
the bold step, which the writer feels is dictated by both precedent
and policy, of rejecting the rule absolutely.
105 (1962) 38 W.W.R. 245.
106 Ibid, at p. 247.
107 [19623 O.R. 476, at pp. 488-489.
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